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Abstract 
A century after the first air bomb mission, a new intervention in the same geographic space has 
made evident the changes in Airpower. The Aerial Warfare in Libya has radically changed the civil 
war, complying with a UN mission to protect Libyan population, imposing a no-fly zone and an 
arms embargo. Therefore, Operation Unified Protector became one of the most successful 
campaigns in the history of NATO. 
We aim to assess the operational efficiency of Airpower in the conflict in Libya, focusing on the 
challenges of a War essentially Aerial. Despite the military results and the fact that some political 
objectives were met, we can identify some concerning trends that, if not shifted, may negatively 
influence future NATO operations. We do not aim to draw general and universal conclusions on 
the strategic value of Airpower based on the analysis of a specific case. Above all, we focus on 
identifying some lessons which have influenced OUP operational efficiency. Thus, we must 
analyze some factors, such as the scope of objectives, the type of opposing action and aerial 
strategy used by the coalition and then focus on the challenges arising from the OUP.. 
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Introduction 
History repeats itself in a curious way. In October 2011, the first century of Aerial 
Warfare ended the same way and place it had begun - with military aircrafts bombing 
the desert of Libya. 
On 15 October 1911, only eight years after the Wright brothers' first flight, nine 
aircrafts and 11 Italian pilots landed in Libya to support the conflict between the Italian 
and the Turkish Ottoman armies. On the first day of November, the young pilot Giulio 
Gavotti introduced the world to Aerial Warfare. The era of air bombing began, along 
with its horrors. In a letter to his father, Gavotti wrote:  
 
"Two boxes with bombs arrived today. They expect us to drop them 
from the plane. It is rather strange that our superiors have not told us 
about this. So, we will take them on board very carefully. It will be very 
interesting to try them on the Turkish" (Johnston, 2011).  
 
Still using the first person, Gavotti describes this historic moment. "Next to the seat, 
inside a bag, I placed three small bombs weighing about a kilo and a half. In my 
jacket's pocket I placed another bomb. When I saw the target, some tents around an 
oasis, I placed the bombs on my lap, withdrew the safety pin and threw them out 
trying not to hit the plane's wing" (Idem). Seconds after having dropped the bombs, 
the pilot assessed the damages of the first air bombing in history. Despite the 
negligible destruction, Gavotti proved that the air missions were not limited to 
battlefield reconnaissance, mere observers of military forces in the field. Far from his 
imagination, though, was the destruction Aerial Warfare would cause in the next 
decades, the evolution of air capacity and that Airpower would become the leading 
instrument of military coercion. 
A century after the first air bomb mission, a new intervention in the same geographic 
space, has undoubtedly revealed the changes in Airpower, thus leading the Secretary-
General of the Alliance to declare 1
The last attack mission in Libya occurred in the city of Sirte, at 08:30 on 20 October 
2011. The unmanned vehicle Predator on combat patrol, controlled in the United States 
of America (USA) via satellite, detected a convoy of 75 armed vehicles leaving the city. 
 that "no air operation in history was as precise and 
careful to avoid civilian suffering" (Rasmussen, 2011a). 
                                                        
1  NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
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Hellfire missiles were launched from the Predator and the convoy was dispersed. 
Moments later, a pair of French Mirage F1CR and Mirage 2000 fighter-bombers flew to 
the place directed by an English E-3D AWACS command and control airship. The Mirage 
2000D launched a GBU-12 bomb, which destroyed 10 vehicles. The isolation of the 
convoy allowed for Kaddafi to be captured and for the end of the conflict which had 
begun on 19 March of that year (NATO, 2011a). 
The Aerial Warfare has radically changed the civil war, complying with a United Nations 
(UN) mission to protect the Libyan population, impose a no-fly zone and an arms 
embargo. Therefore, Operation Unified Protector (OUP) became one of the most 
successful campaigns in the history of NATO (Rasmussen, 2011b). After the operation, 
the use of Airpower re-emerged as a relevant instrument to coerce the opponent with 
reduced risk or cost, namely in terms of human casualties. This ability to dissuade and 
influence potential opponents, to directly affect their sources of power and will to fight 
without exclusively depending on direct combat, make this military option politically 
attractive. 
We aim to assess the operational efficiency of Airpower in the conflict in Libya, focusing 
on the challenges of a War that was essentially Aerial. Despite the military results and 
the fact that some political objectives were met, we can identify some concerning 
trends that, if not shifted, may negatively influence future NATO operations. We do not 
aim to draw general and universal conclusions on the strategic value of Airpower based 
on the analysis of a specific case. Above all, we focus on identifying some lessons which 
have influenced OUP operational efficiency. Thus, we must analyze some factors, such 
as the scope of objectives, the type of opposing action and aerial strategy used by the 
coalition and then focus on the challenges arising from the OUP.  
 
Airpower: vectors of a concept 
If we consider Clausewitz's idea, that War is politics by other means, we can easily 
understand that any military campaign begins with a political decision about its desired 
outcome2.  NATO classifies operations in terms of the predominant campaign themes3, 
which require different military approaches and capacities. All themes require the same 
modes of military activities, though in different levels and usage - simultaneous or in 
sequence4. The predominance of certain modes over others determines the type of 
campaign. For example, a combat campaign consists of essentially offensive activities. 
On the other hand, a security campaign is a complex mix of four modes. In order to 
contribute to the different campaign themes, by means of several military activities, 
military components use the features and capacities of Airpower, including space, so 
that 5lethal and non-lethal effects achieve their objectives6
                                                        
2  Political and/or military situation to be achieved at the end of an operation (AAP-6, 2010). 
 and thus attain the desired 
outcome. 
3 Combat; Security; Peace Operations; military involvement in peace (AJP 3(B), 2011: 1-3). 
4 Offensive; Defensive; Stabilization and Facilitators AJP 3 (B), 2011: 1-3). 
5  They are a physical state or behaviour of a system due to an action, a set of actions or any other effect 
(JP 5-0, 2011: xxi).  
6 Objectives are important for the commander of the joint forces because they link the purpose of the 
operation with its desired end, thus leading campaign efforts to prioritize the use of available resources. 
Therefore, they assist in organizing tasks and effects in time and space. 
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Since the first manned flight, theoricians of Airpower have advocated its efficiency.  
However, through history, extreme declarations on the crucial results of the use of 
Airpower have obscured the conceptual and real value of this instrument of Power. The 
conceptualization of Airpower as a instrument of distance fighting dates back to the 
original idea of overcoming the cruel ground fighting. Airpower, due to height, speed 
and range, has operational advantages over other military instruments and allows for a 
wider perspective of the battlefield, greater speed and distance travelled, as well as 
unrestricted three-dimensional movement, thus significantly changing conflict 
dynamics.  
The flexibility of air capacity, expressed in geographical, operational and effect terms, 
allows it to meet multiple challenges (Sabin, 2010). The geographical flexibility results 
from its ability to avoid the opponents' armies and navy, to minimize the impact of 
geography and allow it to act in different war scenarios and rapidly go from one to the 
other, attacking targets without having to be in advantage on the ground.  The 
operational flexibility results from its ability to operate in a transversal way in various 
types of conflicts while minimizing the risks of using military force. The weakness of 
aerial means, such as helicopters and unmanned vehicles, is compensated by the use 
of height and speed to avoid the range of possible threats. The flexibility of effects, due 
to enhanced awareness of the battlefield, survival and arms' precision, is expressed by 
the possibility of having a mass effect without having to use mass force and better 
adjust effects to the battlefield. 
In this scope, we may see Airpower as a provider of political and military freedom of 
action (Dalton, 2010). At political level, it provides the air defense of territory, as well 
as strategic alternatives to the use of force, since it exerts increasing and sustainable 
global influence. At military level, it provides the ability of air control, a prerequisite for 
any modern deployable military operation. However, from the political point of view, 
War, in particular when a consequence of non vital interests, will always have 
restrictions and constraints which will influence the strategy and efficiency of Airpower. 
These restrictions and restraints to the use of force may include, among others, target 
restriction, reduction of collateral damages, conflict duration, the number of means 
used, the area of operations or the strict abidance to the Rules of Engagement (ROE). 
 
Operational analysis of the use of Airpower in the War in Libya 
One of the historic examples that synthesizes the efficiency of Airpower to coerce a 
change in the opponent's behavior was the attack to Libya in 1986. The Operation El 
Dorado Canyon had limited objectives, was used against a conventional opponent, 
attacked critical infrastructures and was integrated in other instruments of power. The 
political objectives aimed to punish Kaddafi for the attack against American forces in 
Berlin, as well as to dissuade the regime sponsoring terrorist actions. Though the 
political constraints imposed that the risk for American forces was reduced and 
collateral damages minimized, there was significant change in Kaddafi's behavior 
(Stanik, 2003: 151). Nevertheless, noteworthy is to remember that this change was 
short-lived, as two year later after the attack, Kaddafi's regime was responsible for the 
Lockerbie attack, hitting a commercial airplane and causing 270 casualties.  However, 
this operation demonstrated that the use of Airpower, combined with economic and 
diplomatic measures, may influence and ease attaining foreign policy objectives, at 
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least in the short run. Five years later, the lessons learned from this operation were 
applied in the war in the Persian Gulf.  
Twenty-five years after the first attack, a new airborne operation against Kaddafi, also 
with limited objectives, had more decisive and long-lasting effects. When analysts 
discussed the end of interstate conflict, and after a decade in which two wars took 
place, with high number of casualties and costs, history repeats itself in the success of 
Airpower as a instrument of coercion. As in Kosovo, the recent operation in Libya 
confirmed the operational efficiency of Airpower. Though terrestrial warfare is viewed 
as expensive, with high number of casualties over a long period of time, the operation 
in Libya brought back the political interest in air campaigns. 
Considering the Civil War in Libya and the paradigm of "responsibility to protect", the 
UN Security Council approved Resolution 1973 on 17 March 2011, authorizing the use 
of all measures necessary to protect civilians, yet excluding the occupation of territory. 
On 19 March 2011, a multinational coalition led by the USA7
On 31 March, NATO took over the operations, extended the coalition to 18 countries
 began a military 
intervention to implement the UN's mandate. 
8
This conflict renewed the trend to organize military operations with reduced operational 
footprint, combining Special Forces in support of rebel forces and precise amounts of 
Airpower, similar to the success of the "Afghan Model" in the early stages of Operation 
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. In this operational model, Airpower once more 
eliminated efficiency of a regular army and provided an asymmetric and overwhelming 
capacity to a badly trained and equipped rebel group to defeat the forces loyal to the 
regime. In this sense, the restricted air campaign, resorting exclusively to precision 
ammunition, became the most accurate air operation in history (Rasmussen, 2011a). 
, 
maintaining protection of civilians and populated areas under attack as the OUP's 
primary objective, ensuring the non-use of terrestrial means of warfare. The mission 
included a navy embargo, a no-fly zone and offensive actions to meet the objectives of 
the mandate. After 214 days of air operations by about 260 aircrafts, over 26,500 
missions took place, 9,700 of which were attacks, having destroyed over 5,900 targets, 
including 400 artillery positions and rocket launchers and over 600 armored vehicles, 
the OUP ended on 31 October 2011, having become one of the most successful 
campaigns in the history of the Alliance (NATO, 2011b). Furthermore, during the air 
operations only three aircrafts were lost (one of which an unmanned helicopter) and 
the coalition suffered no casualties.  
However, to assess the operational efficiency of the use of Airpower and learn some 
lessons from this operation, we must study some of the essential factors, namely the 
nature of objectives, the type of opponent and air strategy. 
 The UN's mandate defined the political objectives of the intervention. However, as the 
operation developed, so did the ambiguity of the political objectives. For the USA, the 
intervention in Libya fit the parameters of the Obama doctrine, according to which 
humanitarian interests justify military action, though very restricted, with no terrestrial 
forces involved and in a multilateral shared effort, including the leadership of 
                                                        
7 Different names were given to the operations according to each participant: Operation Harmattan by 
France; Operation Ellamy by England; Operation Mobile by Canada and Operation Odyssey Dawn by the 
USA. Later, Operation Unified Protector led by NATO. 
8  Among which Jordan, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Sweden. 
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operations (Biddle, 2011). From the point of view of foreign policy, Airpower is an 
irresistible option because it is more accurate, less expensive and would pose less 
political and operational risk. Perhaps that may help to explain the fact that only 10 
days after the decision to intervene, the first missions in Libya took place9
Whereas this was a crucial fight for the Libyan rebels, for NATO, the OUP was another 
restricted operation, subject to different political interests and complying to a UN 
mandate that restricted the application of the most effective air strategy. The 
ambiguity, or better, the dyssynchrony of objectives lay in the difference in terms of 
NATO objectives and the political declarations of the participating countries. Some of 
the countries, such as England and France, included the removal of Kaddafi as an 
objective of the operation though they never stated it openly. The commander of the 
OUP himself, General Bouchard, pointed out these differences between NATO's strategic 
communication and the countries' public relations. According to him, the fact that the 
operation objectives did not frequently coincide with national interests, the short time 
to plan the operation (about three weeks to prepare the operation plans), as well as the 
reduced capacities on the ground and the chaos in the country added to the complexity 
of the planning and the implementation (Gomes, 2011).  
. 
As far as the opponent and its tactics are concerned, we may say that the Libyan 
military forces adopted a conventional position. The geography of the battlefield 
favored the use of aerial means and navy fires against conventional forces moving in 
open spaces, preventing their supply chain logistics and massification of forces. The 
Libyan army's gradual change to irregular tactics was a natural consequence of the air 
attacks. As a result of their copying rebel tactics, such as the use of civil vehicles, 
transporting armament and not wearing uniforms, air operations became even more 
complex. The use of captured material by the rebel forces also added to the "War fog", 
becoming one of the reasons behind an incident in which Libyan armored cars operated 
by rebels were attacked (Svendsen, 2011: 56). 
As far as the coalition's air strategy is concerned and due to the several constraints, the 
use of Airpower was organized in a gradual approach and bearing in mind the 
minimizing of collateral damages. The initial attack, on 19 March, by French aircraft and 
against armored vehicles in the outskirts of Benghazi, led some observers to point out 
a shift in traditional air strategy. However, this was an isolated action, politically 
motivated and aimed at causing an immediate impact on the ground. That same night, 
112 Tomahawk missiles were launched from American and British ships against critical 
elements in the Libyan air defense system, followed by B-2 bomber attacks to 
aerodromes (Anrig, 2011:91)10
                                                        
9  In comparison, 11 months went by between the approval of the UN's mandate and the intervention in 
Kosovo in 1999, more precisely the mission to implement a no-fly zone (Shanker, Schmitt, 2011). 
. An offensive aerial warfare campaign was in place, 
crucial to gain air control at the onset of any conflict. This mode of action confirmed 
one of the most obvious and timeless lessons taken from other conflicts, which is that 
success depends on establishing air control early. This occurred in the early moments 
of Operation Odyssey Dawn in which Libyan capacity in terms of air defense was rapidly 
destroyed, making it possible to establish a new no-fly zone.  
10  In the first evening of the operation, 3 B-2 bombers took off from the USA, attacked 45 targets in a 
Libyan aerodrome and returned to base, thus confirming US capacity for global attack, as it had happened 
in Serbia in 1999, and in Afghanistan and Iraq (Tirpak, 2011:37). 
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Once air control was established, the target selection process was altered. The initial 
strategy focused on attacking concentrated forces, communications, arms depots and 
key-points in Command and Control (C2) (Bouchard, 2012). In mid April, only 10% of 
daily missions attacked planned targets. The other 90% attacked dynamic targets 
(Anrig, 2011:99)11. In practice, airships patrolled certain areas, namely means of 
communication, so as to detect potential targets. This type of reconnaissance and 
coordination attack missions12
Air operations (kinetics or not) aim to influence the Centers of Gravity (CoG)
 provided the necessary support to initial fire against 
rebel forces when in contact with the Libyan forces. Therefore, the human factor 
became as important as technology in target selection, particularly in those air missions 
near friendly forces, when restrictions in lethal force were imposed so as to ensure 
minimum collateral damages (Baker, 2011). 
13
Therefore, the fall of the regime was the ultimate and necessary effect to a political 
and/or military situation allowing for the conclusion of the OUP. This fact may lead 
some thinkers into considering the fall of the regime the desired end. However, the 
condition defined at the beginning of the operation aimed to attain a situation in which 
there were no hostilities, all major weapon systems had been removed from the 
concentration area and humanitarian aid could freely move in the territory (Bouchard, 
2012). 
 
established for the campaign (Bouchard, 2012). In practical terms, three CoGs were 
selected which were related with the main players in the conflict. Thus, Benghazi was 
selected as the rebel CoG, considering its importance as a symbol of the resistance. 
Tripoli was selected as the regime's CoG, as the Libyan power and its military forces 
were concentrated there. Finally, from NATO's point of view, the CoG was the coalition 
itself, whose integrity should be protected at all cost to maintain a united command 
and action. 
Although the operation may be globally viewed as a military success, we may select 
some challenges the war brought about, especially in Africa. As in any conflict, opinions 
are not unanimous. 
Critics focus on overestimating Airpower efficiency as a result of the operation being 
misinterpreted.  Robert Farley (2011) identifies these gaps, namely the excess 
concentration on tactical targets rather than the classical option for strategic targets in 
the use of Airpower. After several months, there were still important stationary targets 
which had not yet been attacked. That was the case of C2 centers and state 
communications. In an ideal strategy, these targets would have been attacked in the 
early stages of the air campaign. From this point of view, the tactical campaigns, in 
which aerial means are given to commanders on the ground (in this case to Special 
                                                        
11  In modern complex conflicts, dynamic targeting (as opposed to deliberate targeting) is the name given to 
the process of identifying, selecting and attributing unforeseen targets, i.e., those targets which were 
identified too late to be included in the normal planning process. In accordance to NATO doctrine, a target 
is "a geographical area, an object, capacity, person or organization (including its will, understanding and 
behaviour) which may be influenced as part of military contribution to the final political state". The 
process of Targeting aims to determine the effects necessary to attain the objectives of the commander, 
identifying the necessary actions for the desired effects, bearing in mind the means available, the 
selection and prioritization of targets and synchronization of fires with other military capacities, and later 
assessing their efficiency (AJP-3.9, 2008: 1-1). 
12  Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance (SCAR). 
13  Center of Gravity - Characteristics, capacity or place from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or 
any other group built its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight (AJP 01(D), 2010: 5A1). 
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Forces and Libyan rebels), make Airpower a rather more expensive artillery and waste 
its real potential. However, the destruction of armored vehicles, of supply vehicles and 
entrenched forces, viewed by many as irrelevant and not endowed with the multiplying 
effect associated to strategic targets, as is the case of communication networks and 
command centers, have contributed to directly reduce the threat to civilians, in strict 
compliance with the UN's mandate. Furthermore, the strategic targets, essential to 
establishing a no-fly zone, were deeply affected in the early hours of the conflict.  
Much criticism related to the inefficiency of the operation is based on the duration of 
the campaign, due to the inadequate air strategy and taking into account the 
asymmetry between Kaddafi and NATO's forces. Cenciotti (2011) emphasizes the 
coalition's delay in deciding to attack the regime's ability to supply its forces instead of 
attacking resources at the front, when they are to be used. The dispersion of attacks to 
innumerous arms depots, rather than concentrating on the most important, during the 
early stages of the conflict, may have allowed for the forces loyal to the regime having 
been able to continue fighting for more than seven months.  
This criticism, however, confuses targets and effects, disregards the fact that the use of 
Airpower in a limited operation is subject to military and political restrictions and 
constraints. We must realize that in an Era of limited conflicts, in coalitions in which 
countries have different interests, severely restricted and submitted to limited ROEs to 
avoid collateral damages and breaches in the coalition, an air strategy under ideal 
conditions will rarely occur. In this case, the interpretation of the UN's mandate 
suggested the impossibility of attacking targets which did not directly threatened the 
population. This way, the imposition to avoid suffering and damages to civilians, as 
emphasized by Secretary-General of NATO, conditioned the process of target selection. 
Similarly, the caveats imposed by nations in terms of the attacks added to the 
complexity of the targeting process. For example, some nations only led attack 
missions when Kaddafi's forces were moving against rebel positions (Book, 2012: 69). 
Besides this, implementing an adequate air strategy is directly associated to knowing 
the operational environment and the opponent. Therefore, the lack of means of 
surveillance and reconnaissance14
On the other hand, the contribution of Airpower to field operations can only be 
maximized, in particular in activities of fire support, if it is integrated in the ground 
forces. As the conflict developed, the requirements and complexity of air support 
imposed a closer integration and a faster response. However, the difficulties in 
integrating air-to-ground activities, namely in coordinating with the rebels, may have 
affected the pace and intensity in the use of Airpower.
 in comparison with other recent conflicts may help to 
explain some of the shortcomings.  For example, during the last decade of operations in 
Afghanistan, NATO usually had hundreds of ISR daily missions, as opposed to three 
daily ones in Libya, a territory which is three times larger (Tillyard, 2012: 23). This 
forced a prioritization in the operational use of dedicated means as well as caused 
differences in the analysis as to how most adequately affect the Libyan regime. 
15
                                                        
14  Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance – ISR. 
 This occurred because the 
rebel forces had operational limitations, they were badly equipped and prepared, were 
uncoordinated in terms of C2 and communications, which did not allow for detail 
15  In comparison, in the 78 days of the air campaign in Serbia in 1999 there were 38,004 missions, 14,112 
of which were attack missions (Cenciotti, 2011).  
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coordination of operations and added to the complexity of the attack missions as well 
as heightened the probability of collateral damages. Nevertheless, even if the model of 
mass and overwhelming air attacks was not applied, as it had been in the Gulf Wars, it 
would still be impossible to explore its effects on the ground.  
The nature of the dynamic process of target selection, together with the reduced 
persistence of manned aerial means, as well as the rigorous choice of moments for 
arms launching so as to avoid collateral damages, may greatly justify the fact that 
most attack missions did not use arms. As the operations developed, the use of foreign 
military and special forces counselors who were not part of NATO command structure 
so as to not compromise the UN's mandate, was essential in order to guide attack 
aircraft, to gather information and, above all, to transform the badly-equipped and 
trained rebel group into an organized force to capture Tripoli (Svendsen, 2011: 58)  
Besides the already discussed factors, we may also identify additional lessons which 
separate the war in Libya from past conflicts but which, on the other hand, echo 
concerning trends. 
First of all, England and France were at the forefront, having been responsible for most 
of the war effort.  NATO's European Allies provided most of the fighting means; the 
USA assigned themselves a secondary role after the operation command was passed on 
to NATO. This means that, though the USA did most combat missions initially, once the 
operation command was assigned to NATO, the effort was divided among the allies. In 
fact, the remaining members did 90% of attack missions (Hebert, 2011: 4).  
The complexity of coordinating air operations by 18 countries, from bases around 
Europe and the USA, with no casualties in the coalition, is further evidence of the 
success of the operation. In the initial phase, there were uncertainties in terms of 
command relation among the participants. On the one hand, from the American point 
of view, the African Command (AFRICOM) was in charge of coalition operations, 
whereas, from the European point of view, each nation was in charge of operations. 
This ambiguity led to Norway suspending its participation until C2 relations were clear 
(Anrig, 2011: 91). This only occurred when the command of the operation was taken 
over by NATO.  
On the other hand, efficiency and, up to a point, the efficacy of air campaigns depends 
greatly on the closeness between aerial means and operational areas. Otherwise, the 
manned systems will be severely restricted in terms of operational area, which also 
implies an excessive use of airborne refueling capacities. The option to use aerial 
means initially covered this need but it was severely affected by the USA no longer 
carrying out attack missions and thus evidencing the historical importance of Airpower 
based on ships16 as well as the fact that Europe lacks aircraft carriers.17
                                                        
16 The aircraft carrier became an essential instrument for the success of military operations. Several 
examples emphasize the importance of these means for power projection, both long-distance and in areas 
where an aerodrome is of difficult implementation.  The attack on Pearl Harbour or the dependency on 
aerial means on ships in the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.   
 Therefore, the 
17 In June, the Italians withdrew their aircraft carrier from the theatre of operations. Later, the aircraft 
carrier Charles de Gaulle left the area of operations. The English only had a helicopter cruiser, obviously 
insufficient for the size of the operation. 
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use of Airpower on ships allowed for faster and more flexible response, as well as a 
decrease in the use of long-distance based resources18
Another lesson is that, despite the effort by some countries and the fact that the OUP 
was commanded by NATO, only half of the Allies contributed in terms military forces. 
This situation confirmed NATO's view of an "Alliance of those available"; because there 
is no overwhelming threat as during the Cold War, the differences among members in 
terms of their political agendas are made evident (UK Parliament, 2011). This became 
obvious as only 6 out of the 26 European countries in NATO contributed with attack 
capacities. In fact, the conflict in Libya increases the existing gaps in NATO, evidencing 
Europe's ambition in sharing operation theory and concepts with the Americans, as well 
as its incapacity in terms of war effort so as be able to apply the American warfare 
model. This paradigm was made evident in its inability to carry out missions essential 
to maintain limited air conflict, in particular airborne refueling suppliers and unmanned 
aircraft. This gap will be wider in conflicts geographically distant either without the 
mass support of the USA or against more able opponents. 
. 
The American attitude, to offer leadership and offensive power to European countries, 
has contributed to minimize the political debate and public scrutiny on yet another long 
intervention in a Muslim country. However, this secondary role did not correspond to a 
decrease in the importance of the USA in the campaign, considering that they had to 
supply what the coalition lacked within specific areas of the mission. As Robert Gates, 
the former American Secretary for the Defense (2011) stated, "the most advanced 
fighter airplanes are useless if the Allies do not have the means necessary to identify, 
process and attack targets as part of an integrated campaign". The dependency on 
American capacities was also obvious in airborne refueling and ISR (among which, the 
use of unmanned platforms), considering that 75% of ISR and airborne refueling 
missions were carried out by the USA (Hebert, 2011: 4). 
Without these priceless means, the efficiency of the OUP would have been severely 
compromised. For example, missions from more distant European bases were eight 
hours' away and implied five airborne refueling activities for one hour on the objective 
(Tirpak, 2011: 36). Gates (2011), when referring to other difficulties, emphasized that 
the USA had to supply the majority of targeting analysts to ensure the Air Operations 
Centre. Besides this, the Operations Centre, prepared to manage 300 daily missions, 
struggled to manage 150 (about a third of the daily effort in Operation Allied Force in 
1999).  
This conflict also evidences the impact of austerity in the War; several countries 
struggle in defining the suitable capacities and, above all, at reasonable prices. 
Specialization in a specific type of capacity, assuming another member of the coalition 
makes available deficient capacities, implies risks because it cannot always be counted 
on. Though they have a reasonable attack capacity, European countries lack the means 
for an efficient operation, namely refueling systems, electronic war, ISR and human 
resources specialized in targeting and data analysis. 
Besides the already mentioned needs, two months into the operation and there were 
already supply failures in guided ammunition (Gates, 2011). This occurred because the 
exclusive use of precision arms caused it to run out in some countries. For example, 
                                                        
18  According to a study on the use of Airpower in OUP, the use of aircrafts based on land is six times more 
expensive when compared to similar effects caused by means stationed on ships (UK Parliament, 2011). 
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Danish F-16 dropped more than 500 guided ammunition until the mid of June, thus 
creating a problem in logistics typical of this type of conflict, particularly in the case of 
smaller air forces (Anrig, 2011: 96)  However, this does not reflect a direct relation 
between quantity of arms used and their effects. For example, Norway and Denmark 
supplied only 12% of the means for air attack but reached a third of their targets 
(Gates, 2011). 
The theatre of operations in Libya allowed for test and operational assessment of the 
military capacities of the Alliance members. Besides, it was also an opportunity for 
economic, military and political marketing for the advocates of Navy and Airpower. The 
struggle in arms system exporting markets19 pressures participants to show their scope 
of capacities and thus increase the complexity of their mode of action.20
We can claim that the campaign in Libya is an example of success in terms of the use 
of Airpower to unbalance the balance of power and favoring a resistance movement 
against a superior force (Anrig, 2011: 104). Assessing its efficiency, considering its 
cost, shows that this operation represented a fraction of the costs in the conflicts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq
 The advocates 
of Airpower are already capitalizing on this success, the success in Libya justifies higher 
investment in fighters, bombers, refueling systems and unmanned airships. 
Furthermore, the shift in American defense strategy for the Pacific increases the 
relevance of Airpower, more specifically of navy operation. As in previous conflicts, the 
lessons learned with the conflict in Libya will shape the power system and how the 
great powers will acquire new military capacities.  Besides, these lessons will be the 
basis for future military interventions. 
21. However, more important than financial costs is the low 
number of friendly casualties and the collateral damages22
 
. Though we believe the use 
of Airpower in this conflict could have been optimized, the truth is that it was an 
adequate political tool to abide to the UN resolution, meeting the political objectives 
established, at a substantially lower cost than the available military alternatives. And 
that, in itself, evidences the strategic usefulness of Airpower as a instrument of 
coercion. However, instead of considering Airpower decisive, we consider there is no 
doubt that victory was attained due to the contribution of Airpower.  
Conclusion 
When considering future wars, we must account for not all having such a low human 
and material cost. There will be conflicts in which long ground occupation and high 
human cost will be the only means to the desired end. However, the advocates of 
ground intervention in Libya, focusing on the operational advantages to speed regime 
                                                        
19 We must not forget that during that period, both the English Typhon as the French Rafale were included in 
a airship sales proposal to India and Brazil. 
20  For example, the use of Tornado airships equipped with Storm Shadow last generation missiles, in long 
distance missions from England, is an indicator of the English projection ability in the global market as 
well as validates this technology in future updating on the power system. Operational necessity, after 100 
days of air campaign, to do eight-hour missions so as to use a €900,000 missile is difficult to understand 
(Cenciotti, 2011). 
21 The American contribution during seven months (about 1.1 billion dollars) was similar to the cost of one 
week's operation in Afghanistan (Schwartz, 2012). 
22 The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq caused, up to now, injuries in over 46,000 American military and 
over 6,200 casualties (US DoD, 2012: 7). The collateral damages are countless.  
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capitulation, did not consider the adverse strategic effects of the occupation of another 
Muslim country by western forces, thus leading to a new irregular long conflict. 
The criticism on the reduced efficiency of the use of Airpower, or even of a high cost-
efficiency or value ratio, as a result of the increased cost of air weapons, may be 
refuted from a capacity and effect perspective.  This means that technological progress 
has allowed for substantial increase in the capacities of current weapon systems and, 
consequently, a lower cost for desired effect, whether in the number of targets 
destroyed by the airship as in the increased awareness of the battlefield through the 
use of more developed sensors, often in the same platform. This multiplies the 
capacities of a power with a decreased number of weapon systems. Therefore, 
assessing the success of a campaign through the quantity of means involved does not 
seem adequate; the effects are the most important. 
To sum up, despite the criticism, these analyses lack an assessment of the growing 
political restrictions imposed on the use of Airpower as well as of the more and more 
precise and strict use of air force. The legitimate imposition of political restraints and 
restrictions, together with the inherent limitations to the use of Airpower, and the 
omnipresent "fog and friction", do not allow for a simple solution for the phenomenon 
of War. However, to be effective, Airpower does not have to win wars.  It only needs to 
supply flexible options to be used by political decision-makers when the use of force is 
required to coerce a change in the opponent's behavior. Thus, the efficiency of 
Airpower should be assessed taking into account its contribution to meeting the political 
objectives. This means that Airpower may have political effects through resorting to a 
wide scope of means, whether through dissuasion, long distance attacks, persistent 
ISR, special forces or air transport, intelligence operations, humanitarian aid, 
establishment of partnerships and economic development. 
We must not, however, forget that contemporary conflict demonstrates the historical 
truth that Airpower, per si, is not a panacea to resolve armed conflict, thus evidencing 
that the use of this toll will necessarily have to be integrated with other military 
components and within a wider approach through coordination with other power tools. 
Therefore, despite the operational brilliancy of the OUP, it is still early to confirm the 
long-term strategic effects that ensure long-lasting peace. We can only claim that this 
supreme objective goes well beyond the potential of the military tool, requiring a wider 
approach to the phenomenon of hostile conflict. As in the past, this is still the challenge 
facing the future use of force. 
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